The Pre-Mortem: Gary Klein's Technique for Killing Bad Plans Before They Kill You

The Psychological Foundation

In 1989, Deborah J. Mitchell (Wharton), Jay Russo (Cornell), and Nancy Pennington (University of Colorado) studied a phenomenon they called prospective hindsight. Their finding: imagining that an event has already occurred, as opposed to imagining that it might occur, increases the ability to correctly identify reasons for future outcomes by 30%.

The mechanism is specific. When you ask someone to consider "what could go wrong?" they generate possibilities from a posture of uncertainty and optimism. When you ask them to assume the project has definitively failed and explain why, their mental model shifts from possibility to explanation, and that shift unlocks dramatically more and more specific risk information.

Gary Klein formalized this finding into the pre-mortem in a 2007 Harvard Business Review article. The technique converts the psychological benefit of hindsight into a prospective tool, giving teams access to the cognitive clarity of "looking back" before the project has even started.

The Exact Protocol

Klein's pre-mortem runs in 20–30 minutes. The steps:

1. Set the premise. Tell the team: "Imagine it is [X months from now] and the project has completely failed. It did not merely underperform: it failed badly. Take a moment to let that land."
2. Independent writing. Everyone spends two to three minutes writing every reason they can think of for the failure. This step must be done silently and individually, before anyone shares.
3. Round-robin sharing. Go around the table. Each person shares one reason per round, and reasons are written on a shared document or whiteboard. Continue until the list is exhausted.
4. Pattern identification. Facilitate a brief discussion: which of these failure modes are most plausible? Which are most severe? Which are already visible in the current plan?
5. Plan revision. Strengthen the plan to address the highest-probability/highest-severity failure modes identified.

The Most Common Mistake: Running It With Senior Leadership Present

The pre-mortem derives its value from candor. Team members will articulate risks they have privately suspected but would not raise in a normal planning meeting: risks that implicitly criticize the plan, the leader who championed it, or the organizational consensus behind it.

When senior executives are present during the pre-mortem, this candor collapses. Junior team members observe the room. They calibrate their contributions to what seems safe. The result is a pre-mortem that surfaces only the risks everyone already knows about and felt comfortable naming, which is exactly the set of risks that a standard risk-assessment would have found anyway.

Klein's recommendation: run the pre-mortem with the team that will execute the project, not the executives who sponsored it. Senior leadership should receive the output (the full list of identified failure modes), not sit in the room while it's generated.

Why Conventional Risk Assessment Fails

Standard risk matrices and risk assessments ask teams to enumerate what might go wrong from a posture of "the plan is probably going to work." The planning optimism bias, extensively documented by Kahneman, systematically makes teams discount low-probability/high-severity risks and underestimate implementation complexity.

The pre-mortem bypasses this by making failure the stipulated premise rather than the possibility. The question changes from "what might go wrong?" to "why did this already go wrong?" That grammatical shift from conditional to past tense is not rhetorical. It activates a meaningfully different cognitive process that produces more and more candid information.

Where It Is Used

Pre-mortems are standard practice in parts of the U.S. military, several large investment banks, and a growing number of technology companies. They are used before product launches, major strategic decisions, M&A integrations, and large technology deployments. The technique is particularly valuable in organizational cultures where surfacing risk is associated with disloyalty to the initiative, because the exercise explicitly frames risk-identification as a contribution to the project's success rather than criticism of it.